I find that most proposals for 'change of scenery' trades are silly. Most fans of teams think that an opposing club will pay full value for their failed prospect in hopes that they may regain their former luster. Fans clamor for their General Manager to pry struggling players from opposing teams for pennies, when no such deal is on the table. (Think I'm kidding? Take a minute to google a guy like Alex Gordon and see what you come up with... here is an example of how he was hotly pursued last year: link)
However, not all proposals to get a player a change of scenery are bad ones -- in fact, there are plenty of scenarios where getting a player out of town might benefit both parties. However, the price for the team dumping the loser or receiving the once-hyped prospect will be steep.
Enough beating around the bush. My idea? The Mets trade Jason Bay to the Red Sox for Carl Crawford and a little cash.
The match could not be better, and I am amazed that it took me so long to see this. Let's start with the basics on the two players.
As you know, Jason Bay has struggled as a Met. He posted a .259 average with 6 HR and an 749 OPS in 2010, and followed that up with a .245 average, 12 HR, and a 703 OPS this year, missing time both years with injuries. Factoring in defense and baserunning, Bay was worth an astoundingly terrible 0.7 WAR this year.
Carl Crawford's welcome to Red Sox Nation may have been even worse. Crawford this year put up a .255 average and 11 HR, but drew almost nothing in the way of walks and posted an OPS of 694. Crawford made up some of the gap with superior defense, but also posted an awful 0.4 WAR.
Jason Bay is owed $16MM in 2012, $16MM in 2013, and has a vesting option for $17MM in 2014 for a total of $49MM over the next three years (or $35 over two years). Crawford is owed the outrageous sum of $122MM over the next six years. Both contracts look like horrible albatrosses.
Why would these teams make the swap?
Why The Red Sox Will Do It
1. Carl Crawford is a dead man walking in Boston. His horrible season for the Sox, combined with his horrific play on the last hit of Boston's season, seals his fate. The gnashing of teeth and wringing of hands in Boston is audible all the way here in Queens.
2. Carl Crawford is not a good fit for Fenway. Why on earth did Boston sign this guy in the first place? In addition to the above, and generic concerns that he may not be cut out for a big market, the Sox took a player who derives a TON of his value from his speed and defense and put him in the smallest left field in the entire baseball universe. They added him to a lineup which already had bona-fide top of the order hitters in Ellsbury, Pedroia, and Gonzalez. Crawford is an afterthought.
3. Jason Bay has already THRIVED in Boston. Maybe Bay is a different player now, but wouldn't it be worth it for them to see if they can roll the dice and at least get some value from Bay, rather than with a guy like Crawford who has been placed in a position where he can do nothing but fail?
Why The Mets Will Do It
1. Jason Bay is a dead man walking in Queens. Back to back terrible seasons. Ending the season on the bench with a "sinus infection," in addition to huge chunks of both seasons. And now the pressure on Bay will become even worse -- all hope for a bounce back is gone, and with back to back losing seasons, the fans will begin to turn on the player with the largest contract.
2. Bay is a terrible fit for Citi Field. The spacious left field, the high fences, and the low-run scoring environment have conspired to make this the worst case scenario for Bay. Granted, Bay did not hit well on the road this season either, but the change of scenery back to Boston may help him.
3. There is HOPE for Carl Crawford, where for Bay there is little to none. As has been pointed out, Carl Crawford was bad, not terrible, for the Sox since starting the season horrendously. After beginning the start of play on May 23rd batting .215/.249/.298, Crawford hit a poor but improved .280/.313/.474 from then until the end of the season, over 352 plate appearances.
Bottom Line?
Both players have enormous contracts and have underperformed greatly. Both players are bad fits for their current clubs, and have worn out their welcomes. And it just so happens that both players play left field.
"But Brian, why would the Sox trade for a player who is older and just as horrible?" The Red Sox, as we all know, are further along on the success cycle right now. If they had Jason Bay in left field instead of Carl Crawford, they may well have won an additional game and made the postseason this year. With that in mind, taking a chance on Jason Bay, with the shorter contract, with the potential that he may regain some of his prior Boston success (where he posted OPSes of 897 and 921), makes sense. It helps, also, that Bay fits comfortably down in the order as opposed to the speedy Crawford. And remember - Bay will only be 33 next year.
"But Brian, why would the Mets take on the longer contract for the player who was worse last year?" A few reasons. As I mentioned above, there is hope that Crawford may succeed in Flushing while there is no such hope for Bay. Furthermore, Crawford is a fantastic fit for Citi Field -- he might even be able to play center field and give the Mets the answer they are looking for at that position so they can open up left field for someone like Lucas Duda, Nick Evans, or someone else. Even moreso, Crawford can hit toward the top of the Mets lineup, where his few talents would not be as wasted as they are in Boston. And he'll fit perfectly in the low scoring National League East... not to mention distract a little from the flurry of negativity that will occur when Reyes departs.
You know you've struck a good deal when people on both sides find it hard to pull the trigger. The one thing that I think the Mets would require to execute this deal is a little financial assistance in years 2014-2017 when Jason Bay's contract is expired and Crawford is still on the books.
Proposal: Mets trade Jason Bay to the Red Sox for Carl Crawford and $5MM in each of the years 2014-2017. The Mets end up with Crawford on a 6/$107MM deal and the Sox get Bay for 3/$49MM plus a future payment of $15MM.
Each team takes on some risk, each team gets an asset from the other that is more likely to succeed for them than for their current team. Neither team wants anything to do with these guys -- so why not put them in a position where they may be able to succeed.
I'd love to hear people's thoughts on this: Is this deal a good match? Would one team love this idea and another team hate it? Are there other factors that I haven't considered?
Showing posts with label theory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label theory. Show all posts
Friday, September 30, 2011
Friday, September 02, 2011
Marginal Value and Why I Don't Care if the Mets Bring Back Reyes
Quickly, who has been the most valuable Met this year?
Has it been Jose Reyes and his league-leading .336 batting average? Did Carlos Beltran have that distinction while he was here? Has David Wright's surge since coming back put him into the discussion?
No, no, and no -- if you are talking money, that is.
When you take into account the salary they are earning, the most valuable Met this season has been none other than Daniel Murphy. No, he does not have the highest WAR of any Met this year -- that distinction goes to Reyes -- but he has provided the most value at the least cost. That makes him the most valuable.
Below is a table with a majority of the Mets regulars, sorted from the highest WAR per dollar to lowest:
[I really hope you can read that. I will provide the text version of that chart at the bottom of the post.] Anybody with access to baseball-reference or fangraphs or who watches the game can tell you to a reasonable degree of certainty who is the most valuable player on the field. But baseball is a business -- just like the other major sports -- and even though you and I might bleed blue-and-orange and think flags fly forever, for those who make the decisions it all comes down to money. It's not that winning is irrelevant -- but winning almost always depends on having a strong financial position from which you can make moves in the future.
Which brings us to this next example, where the Tigers surrendered the 19th pick in the 2010 draft to sign Jose Valverde to a two-year deal worth $14 million, which would be worth $22 million if the Tigers exercise a 2012 club option. Ignoring the draft-pick compensation, Valverde’s contract would look pretty good ... he would be worth $18.2 million if you ignore the draft picks. However, the 19th pick would ... 3.3 wins over the first six years, which ... is $10.5 million in foregone wins.If you go to fangraphs, you'll see that at the bottom of each page they have a section for each player entitled "value." In that section, there is listed the players salary, right next to a column which says "dollars." The dollars column roughly amounts to how much a player providing that much value would cost on the free agent market. Jose Reyes, for example, has posted 5.3 WAR so far this season, while the market in baseball generally values 5.3 WAR at a price of $23.9 million dollars. Daniel Murphy, on the other hand, has provided 3.2 WAR which is valued at $14.3 million dollars.
Jose has been better, but Murphy has provided more bang for his buck.
So herein lies the problem: once Jose Reyes - or any player - becomes eligible to test the free agent market, they are going to find someone to pay them what they are worth. Or as is often the case, more than they are worth. At that point, unless there is some kind of hometown discount being provided, that player is no more or less useful to your team than any other. In fact, he may be LESS useful to your team specifically because you owned him to begin with -- by not allowing him to leave, you fail to get draft pick compensation that you would otherwise have.
For example, if the Mets were confronted with the ability to sign Jose Reyes or Hanley Ramirez, as free agents this winter, my only preference would become who would provide the better DEAL for our team. I love Reyes, he is my favorite player. But I'd rather see my team win without Reyes than lose with him.[1]
Back in 2005, when the Mets were on the precipice of their ill-fated dynasty, the world belonged to them. In David Wright and Jose Reyes, the Mets had lucked into two all-star position players at almost exactly the same time. Between 2006 and 2008, Reyes posted 6.1, 5.8, and 6.4 WAR. In the same time span, Wright posted 5.2, 8.9, and 7.1 WAR. All of those were All-Star campaigns, and in the case of Wright, what had a good argument as an MVP season.
But why did the Mets win so many games from 2006-2008? It wasn't just because they had Wright and Reyes -- they still have Wright and Reyes. It was because in 2006, Wright and Reyes made a COMBINED salary of less than a million dollars. In 2007, they earned around $4.5 million dollars. In 2008, they raked in less than ten million dollars. As a whole, they earned approximately $15 million dollars while providing the Mets with value equivalent to what they would have to pay a free agent approximately $163 million dollars for. That's $150 million dollars of profit.
So what did the Mets do when they had two, young, cost-controlled mega-stars? They used the extra money that they had to PAY free agents. They brought in Pedro Martinez, and Carlos Beltran, and Carlos Delgado, and Billy Wagner and so many others. And for that stretch of time, the Mets were very, very good. But when the Mets failed to win it all, it wasn't just a sadness that could be remedied next year -- it was the end of an era. The window was, and remains, closed, for the Wright-Reyes Mets to be anything special.
Take an example of another very good team, last year's Texas Rangers. They knew that they had a good, cheap nucleus of talent in Josh Hamilton ($5.5M), Ian Kinsler ($4.2M), Nelson Cruz ($440K), and others. They could afford to pay free agent money to players that they thought would push them over the top -- like Vladimir Guerrero.
Even big market teams like the Red Sox cannot win without cost-controlled, home grown stars. The Red Sox have players like Dustin Pedroia, Jacoby Ellsbury, Daniel Bard and Jon Lester under cost control -- so they could trade for Adrian Gonzalez and give him a lucrative contract extension, and they could pick up David Ortiz' contract option, and they could afford to make moves even with John Lackey's contract burdening them.
As for us, with Reyes and Wright reaching the point in their careers where they need to be paid what they are worth, it doesn't really matter if they are Mets or not-- outside of our weak, silly, baseball-fan hearts. They will still be good players, but they will be no better for us than any other roll of the dice that we make on the free agent market. Can a team built around a Wright and Reyes who are being paid market value still win? Of course they can. But the deck is no longer stacked in our favor.
For the next few years, the Mets are going to have to stand by and watch young, practically free superstars like Stephen Strasburg, Jason Heyward, Domonic Brown, Bryce Harper, Mike Stanton, Logan Morrison, Antonio Bastardo, Julio Teheran, Jonny Venters and a host of others provide All-Star if not superstar value for our rivals. The question is -- do the Mets have reinforcements? Can the Mets reload?
All of this, finally, brings us back to the table that we posted at the beginning of this article. Although the Mets don't have any surefire stud prospects waiting in the wings to be our next Wright or Reyes, the Mets certainly do have a lot of cheap players who can provide value in 2012 and beyond. You don't have to be a stats nerd or sabermatrician to understand that having cheap players who can step into roles on a winning club has value. You just may be surprised to learn how much.
Another way of looking at the above table is to look at the value provided beyond the salary they were paid.[2] Sorting this way, Murphy is again the most valuable Met. In third, however, is Jose Reyes, who has provided over $11 million in surplus value despite earning $11 million on this year's contract. All in all, the Mets have 12 players who have provided more than $2 million in surplus value to the team, and even better, all of whom (except Chris Capuano and Reyes) remain under team control next year.
Add to these names (Murphy, Niese, Tejada, Davis, Dickey, Turner, Duda, Thole, Pagan, Parnell) the list of players we discussed last week in our Organization Report, and you've got yourself an excellent core of players to build around.
Would I like the Mets to resign Reyes? Absolutely. Would the Mets be a better team on the field for doing so? Absolutely -- there is no player out there who can replace the value of a stud, in his prime, All-Star shortstop. Will it make the Mets better suited financially in the future to compete with the other teams in the NL East? Hard to say.
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[1]
The fangraphs values, and the generally accepted practice of attaching a dollar value to the WAR provided by a free agent, are misleading in that relative to the entire pool of players playing major league baseball, all free agents are overpaid. As the salaries for players with less major league service time are strictly fixed by the rules and by arbitration, they can only wait for their free agent payday.
[2]
The Top 12 Mets in providing value beyond their salary:
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Monday, August 22, 2011
The Kids Are Alright
One of the best -- and also most frustrating -- things about baseball, is that over time, things always end up like they should. In that way, baseball is like life.
Over the course of 162 grueling games, the best teams will win, the Albert Pujolses will break out of their slumps, the and the Justin Turners will no longer hit .500 with runners in scoring position. It is not like football, where you only need to get through 16 games and can find a Maurice Jones-Drew out of nowhere. It's not like basketball or hockey where half the teams make the postseason. In baseball, six months will usually allow the best teams to prevail and for just enough time for magical fairy dust to wear off.
This is particularly poignant at this moment, as our Mets crash and burn in spectacular fashion (though personally I prefer this scenario to a late season collapse).
The other night, we all watched Dillon Gee struggle epically in his start against the Phillies. Gee was a great story for a while, but for those of us who were more than causal observers, we knew that he wasn't just an extraordinary kind of "gamer" or that he hadn't figured out "how to win" better than the next major league pitcher. Ultimately, you knew that he was going to gravitate toward his actual talent level. Perhaps, Gee will be quite good in the majors. Perhaps Gee has grown over time to become a better pitcher than he was in the minor leagues. But right now, he's sporting a 4.37 ERA, which is a lot closer to what you'd expect for Gee than the 3.32 ERA he had on July 1st. Most likely, he will become, to paraphrase Dennis Green, "who we thought he was."
The reason for this lengthy introduction is because as the Mets play out the string here in late August and September, most fans, myself included, begin to have their thoughts turn to the 2012 season. Thoughts of stars returning from injuries, discussions about free agents, and analysis of minor league prospects will ensue as we assess the strengths and weaknesses of our organization. We here at Fonzie Forever have always consistently stressed that the most important thing that an organization needs to do before making a plan for the next year is to make an honest assessment of there they are TODAY.
As an example, we all remember the Winter and Spring before the 2010 season. For a few months, the Mets maintained the status quo -- they acted for months as if they thought they had a shot to make the playoffs in 2010 and that all they needed to do was patch the holes. They signed Jason Bay to a large, lucrative contract -- one which I at the time predicted would cost Omar Minaya his job. They signed or acquired players such as Alex Cora, Elmer Dessens, Henry Blanco, Gary Mathews Jr., Frank Catalanotto, and Rod Barajas. Those players were, for the most part, players that you might acquire if you THINK you can contend and you need to fill out your bench, bullpen, or Triple-A roster. However, for the 2010 Mets, each and every one of those acquisitions ranged from mistake to disaster. The Mets behavior that offseason wasn't anchored in reality at all, and we here at Fonzie Forever said it every step of the way:
With the health of Carlos Beltran, Johan Santana, and Jose Reyes all uncertain, there was no way a coherent plan could have been developed for the 2010 season. Under any set of circumstances, they were unlikely to succeed. Even if Santana, Beltran, and Reyes all came back strong, the Mets would also need David Wright to return to form, Mike Pelfrey to continue his growth, and for other players to step up.
The Mets, as we've said here before, were very fortunate in 2010. Out of nowhere, we discovered a quality major league center fielder in Angel Pagan; a high quality starter in RA Dickey; David Wright returned to form as an all-star caliber third baseman; Ike Davis had a wildly successful rookie year; and Carlos Beltran returned from his surgery and showed that he had a chance to contribute in 2011.
The 2011 edition of our Mets has been similarly successful, though their successes have been subtle, or modest, or in far away cities such as Binghamton or Port St. Lucie. Leaving aside any discussion of Madoff and the Wilpon's financial trouble -- about which no independent blogger can truly say make any predictions -- the Mets organization as a whole is in a much stronger place today than it was at this time last season.
Obviously, the major league roster now is not as talented as the one we fielded in April -- Davis and Reyes are hurt, while Beltran and K-Rod have been traded -- and not every prospect has advanced his standing. However, from the low minors to the major leagues, there have been a great deal of successes.
Below, I am going to take a look at some of the players who have made significant gains or significantly improved their stock in the last year. Undoubtedly, some of these names will be familiar to casual fans -- and others only to statheads. For space reasons, I'm not going to be able to go over everyone in the low minors, but limit myself to those players already on the major league roster or in the higher minor leagues.
I am proud to report that, for the first time in a while, I am very happy about the strength of the organization in general. An organization does not need to consistently produce super stars in order to be useful -- and in fact, in New York, it is even less important that they do -- because the development of useful, cheap, cost-controlled young players allows you the financial flexibility to make moves elsewhere. Now, on to the players:
Stock Up
Lucas Duda: You can count me as one of the many observers who did not think that Duda would amount to too much in the majors. Before 2010, Duda was a defensively-challenged corner outfielder who at the age of 23 posted an 808 OPS in Double-A. Then, something clicked. People have speculated that Duda had gotten over an injury, but since the bell rung in 2010 -- over 800 at-bats later -- he's been a very, very good hitter. He put up a 999 OPS in Triple-A last year, a 1011 OPS in Triple-A this year, and has hit .275/.345/.464 in the majors this year. In the last 45 games -- a decent proxy for since he's gotten regular playing time -- he's hit .300/.376/.531, which is outstanding.
Nobody is going to project Duda to post a 900 OPS over the course of a full season, but it's pretty clear now that Duda can hit, and that I was wrong about him. It remains to be seen whether Duda's glove will be good enough for the outfield (fangraphs has his career UZR/150 in the outfield at an atrocious -32.9 over a small sample size), but it is clear that Duda's stock is WAY WAY up and that he is a major leaguer.
Kirk Nieuwenhuis: Another player who took his enormous strides of 2010 and solidified them in 2011 was Captain Kirk Nieuwenhuis. Considered an overachiever by many, Kirk was not highly regarded even after posting an 847 OPS in Double-A at the age of 22. Scouting Book called him a fourth outfielder, while Keith Law, who strongly weighs scouting and tools in his ranking, did not place Kirk in his Mets Top 10 before the 2010 season.
The Captain, however, improved on his great 2010 season with a stellar 2011 season before going down with an injury. In 53 games, he batted .298/.403/.505 -- a batting line that will play anywhere, but is fabulous for a 23 year old center fielder. He underwent labrum surgery on his non-throwing shoulder in midseason, and there are substantial questions about how he will recover, but he has shown that, if healthy, he has a bright future.
The Big Three Pitching Prospects -- Matt Harvey, Jeurys Familia, Zack Wheeler: Much virtual ink has been spilled already on these three, so I will be brief, but suffice to say that each of these three have taken big steps forward this year. All three have good "stuff" according to scouts, and have backed it up with their performance on the field.
Harvey, my favorite of the three, has struck out 59 batters in 51 innings in Double-A, including 7 shutout innings yesterday. He's been a little unlucky with balls in play, but with a strikeout to walk ratio of 59-15, he is having one of the best pitching prospect seasons I've seen. Familia may have been even better, with 63 strikeouts in 48 innings and an 11 inning shutout streak of his own in Double-A. Finally, Wheeler, the project of the three, is also striking out more than a batter per inning for the Single-A St. Lucie Mets. Toby Hyde was very impressed with his last start:
His fastball sat 94-96 mph with a few 93 mixed in later and one 97 as well early. He showed both the ability to throw it down with run and sink and throw it shoulder-height to change batters’ eye-level and produce swings and misses. Early on, his curveball was 77 mph with bite, by the end of his outing he was throwing it in the low 80s. It was nasty.I try not to engage in hyperbole, but this is the best crop of Mets pitching prospects that I can recall seeing. All of them, in my opinion, compare favorably to Pelfrey (who, in his own right, was an impressive minor leaguer) and even to Jon Niese (who I was a big fan of from even the beginning).
Josh Satin: Although he doesn't profile to be an impact player any time soon, Satin has transformed himself from a non-factor into a player who can contribute on a major league team. After a relatively unremarkable minor league career, where he posted good-not-great numbers at each minor league level while being a little old for each level, Satin has exploded at the dish this year. He posted a 962 OPS at Double-A before his promotion to Triple-A. While with Buffalo, he's put up a respectable OPS of 808. That mark includes a .392 on-base percentage.
Zach Lutz: Similarly, organizational soldier Lutz made it to Triple-A and has posted an OPS of 933. It was just two seasons ago that Lutz was a non-factor, posting an 822 OPS in High-A. He's been quite good in Buffalo this year, and may find a way to be a useful major leaguer.
Chris Schwinden: Although Schwinden is not as good as his stats would indicate this season, he's taken a big step forward this season for Triple-A Buffalo. Schwinden last season posted a 5.56 ERA in Double-A, and the year before spent the majority of the season in Low-A Savannah. This year, however, Schwinden has handled his promotion to Triple-A with aplomb, posting a 3.60 ERA, 1.22 WHIP, and striking out 8.2 batters per nine innings -- all of which are career bests. The former 22nd Round draft pick may make good.
Jordany Valdespin: The 23 year old Valdespin was featured here a year and a half ago where we said:
There are a lot of reasons to like Valdespin. Obviously, his Savannah performance was good. More importantly, being rated the "best athlete" in the system...ahead of the likes of Wilmer Flores, Jefry Marte, Kirk Nieuwenheis and others says a lot about his tools...In addition, he had a very strong Winter League performance...All of these things point to a bright future for Jordany. Although it could be seen as an indictment of his talent that he has not yet reached High-A ball entering his age 22 season, his physical abilities and variety of talents (speed and defense) make him an intriguing prospect.Jordany is a project, but this year has taken a huge stride forward. After ending the 2010 season with a poor 698 OPS between Single-A and Double-A, he hit a robust .297/.341/.483 for Double-A Binghamton earlier this year. I think that the talk of Valdespin as a potential major leaguer next season is premature, but he is still only 23 and may still have room to grow.
Reese Havens: Back in 2009, when Reese Havens and Ike Davis were coming off their first full seasons in the minor leagues, we here at Fonzie Forever could not understand why Davis was being held in higher regard than Havens. We pointed out here that they were picked only four selections apart in the 2008 draft, both had hit well in the minors, and Havens had the positional adjustment advantage (second base versus first base). However, Havens has been plagued by injuries since then, and his stock -- through early this year -- had dropped substantially.
However, I am glad to report that Havens has come back strong in the last two months, and has upped his batting line in Double-A to .287/.370/.420. Even better, he's gained momentum as the year has gone on, posting a line of .323/.402/.430 since the All-Star Break. Granted, he will have to prove that his injury problems will not derail his once promising career, but Havens stock has certainly risen since April. He's a second baseman capable of posting an OPS of 800 or better, and those are exceedingly rare.
Justin Turner: Although by no stretch would I ever want Justin Turner starting on my contending team, my man @redturn2 has finally gotten the opportunity to show that he deserves to be in the major leagues. Turner hasn't hit a lick since his third week in the majors and his OPS is now down to 678 -- however, he plays decent defense and is fun to be around and can be a piece on a winner. ZiPS projected Turner for a 697 OPS in preseason, which is on the money as usual, but that is fine for organizational depth.
Stock Down
As I mentioned, not everyone in the Mets organization has been all puppies and rainbows in 2011. It's been a tough year for Fernando Martinez, while we watched Jenrry Mejia undergo Tommy John surgery. Stephen Matz, the Mets first pick (second round) of the 2009 draft has had some soreness in his recovery from his own Tommy John. I still believe that these players have a chance to contribute (particularly Mejia, who observers believe can still be a big impact pitcher) but their fortunes have dimmed somewhat since this time last year.
But in general?
A hallmark of a good organization is not just in the superstars at the major league level or super prospects in the minors, but in the depth of the rosters at each level. If you trade a Beltran, do you have a Duda to fill in? If Davis gets hurt, do you have a Daniel Murphy to take his space or do you need to pay a Mike Jacobs?
In that sense, it's been a very, very strong year for the organization. Aside from the one big question mark surrounding the Mets' financial situation, this is a team that could probably start making some noise as early as next year. Provided that the majority of players come back reasonably healthy, this is what the Mets squad could look like next year without a single addition from free agency.
1B Davis
2B Murphy
SS Reyes
3B Wright
LF Bay
CF Pagan
RF Duda
C Thole/Paulino
SP Santana, Niese, Dickey, Pelfrey, Capuano
RP Parnell, Beato, ...
The team as constituted above is not going to win the National League East. The Mets still have significant weaknesses when it comes to the starting rotation and the bullpen, and the Jason Bay contract will haunt the organization for another two years, but given average health that team will not be terrible. And more importantly, it's not constituted so poorly that it makes me want to run to the Mets offices at Citi Field and say "Are you mad?! Trade everything that's not nailed down!! You guys are crazy for keeping up this charade!"
Generally speaking, the players mentioned above have shown that the Mets are going to be less likely to suffer should they be befallen by a major injury. The days of Alex Cora and Miguel Cairo seem to be past, for now. And even better, the above guys, if we need them to play, are going to be making the minimum salary. That is why Angel Pagan and RA Dickey have been the most valuable Mets over the last couple of years -- they are providing value and barely costing anything.
These kids are alright. Luckily, all the trading of stars and doom and gloom at the major league level hasn't done anything to dampen the future prospects of our minor leaguers. Granted, reinforcements would have been nice in 2009, or 2008, but once again, that's part of the beauty of baseball.
Prospects, or major leaguers, or injuries, or luck, don't develop because you NEED them to at that moment. That's one of the beautiful things about baseball. Tragically, Daniel Murphy got injured again this year, just when we needed him. The Mets made silly moves in advance of 2010 because they thought they needed to compete, and damn the fact that the roster just wasn't good enough at that point. Where are we on the success cycle?
These kids are alright. The ones above -- and many others, who I did not get a chance to mention -- had a good year this year. I am excited to watch our boys play out the string here in late August and September, and hopefully, they'll be here contributing to the major league team very soon.
But not because we need them to. Because they are ready.
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Baseball's Foolish Realignment Plan
I know I'm late to the party on this one, but as they say, better late than never, right? I'd like to give a brief treatment to the potential realignment plan that was first reported by Buster Olney and debated as of late. I know that many others have written longer, and better, about this idea, but I'd like to give it the once-over myself.
The idea, for anyone who doesn't know, would be to have 15 teams in the American and National Leagues, to eliminate divisions, and to simply have the teams with the five best records make the playoffs. I for one think this would be a huge mistake.
First, it is important to note that aside from Buster Olney, several very well-respected baseball writers have come out in favor of the realignmnent plan. Dave Cameron and Jeff Passan, in particular, do excellent and thoughtful work, and are both strongly in favor of the plan. This means that, despite being originally brought to light by Olney, that this idea must have some credence.
Cameron, in particular, feels that the proposed plan makes for a fairer sport. He points out the disparity between the four-team AL West and the six-team NL Central, and also the fundamental disadvantage that the rest of the AL East has when faced with the Yankee and Red Sox behemoths. Essentially, Cameron concludes that "While I’ve been trained to believe that nearly every “improvement” MLB suggests is probably a bad idea, this actually seems like a pretty fantastic idea to me, in large part due to my desire to see increased fairness in the sport."
Fairness. Fairness? For those in favor of realignment, fairness really does seem to be the main sticking point. And who could disagree? I think we all should hope for a system where the best teams make the playoffs, where all fan bases can have the opportunity to root for a winner, and no team need be structurally disadvantaged. However, I don't think that this drastic realignment plan truly addresses these issues -- and if it did, the downsides far outweigh the advantages.
For the sake of brevity, I'll present the following reasons in list format:
1. If you're concerned about the AL West and NL Central being imbalanced -- which I have been for a decade -- why not just move a team?
Let the Astros, or whomever, go to the AL West. Then, you've got equal divisions everywhere. Will there be the "constant interleague" problem? Sure. But it's no more or less than with the other plan.
2. Getting rid of division races would be terrible for the regular season, and for the sport in general.
Watching division races down the stretch is the best thing about baseball. Would you rather watch the Mets and Phillies battle head to head down the stretch, or watch the Marlins and Padres jockey for the fifth and final playoff spot?
I think we've all seen what it's like when a sport has most of its field battling it out in a vague homogeneous mix. In hockey, the regular season is practically irrelevant. It's the same in basketball. In those sports, all the top teams get to coast to the finish while a few battle it out for the last few playoff spots.
Take, for instance, the National League in 2007. Down the stretch, we were treated to an incredible division race in the NL East ... I need not remind any of you what happened, but it was incredibly exciting and memorable for all of baseball. In the proposed realignment plan, that never happens. The Mets make the playoffs without any dramatics at all.
3. This doesn't solve the problem of competitive imbalance.
What baseball should be striving for is a good competitive balance, and an environment where every team can truly compete. They shouldn't be realigning the sport in order to provide a wimpy excuse where they can say "Hey, there were five playoff spots and you didn't make it! You have nobody to blame but yourself."
Would realignment in any season have helped the Pirates or Royals make the playoffs? Are we really so hung up on the Rays and Red Sox that the entire sport has to have a detrimental make-over? We've already got a wild card -- if the advantage that the Yankees and Red Sox have is, in fact, so steep to the point when it ruins the game, why not address it substantively rather than passive-aggressively?
This realignment plan sounds to me like MLB is conceding that the Yankees and Red Sox will make the playoffs every year, and they need to figure out a way to make it seem fair for the other teams to fight for the scraps. That, to me, is the real problem.
4. What is truly fair? And should the "best teams" making the playoffs even be a concern? And even if the teams with the five best balanced records made the playoffs, would that make them the best?
Ultimately, we all agree that there should be fairness in the sport. But I believe that should be as a result of policy and rule changes to the competition side, not the playoff method.
Was it fair for the Mets to miss the playoffs in 2007 while the Cubs made it with an inferior record? I think that it was. Chicago won it's division, and the Mets did not, even when they had the chance to. Was it fair for the Cardinals to make the playoffs in 2006 with 83 wins, while Philadelphia (85) and Los Angeles (88) went home? I submit to you that it was. We all know what the Cardinals went on to do that season in winning the World Series -- doesn't that make them the best?
Baseball is a game. It's not a scientific study to determine which team is "best" in a given year. I imagine that if there even were a way to determine the "best" team, that they probably don't win the World Series more than a third of the time.
I agree that there are issues in our sport that need addressing. However, radically reshaping the sport and creating a host of other issues (interleague, travel, DH, 15th place teams) is not the way I believe we should be addressing them.
The idea, for anyone who doesn't know, would be to have 15 teams in the American and National Leagues, to eliminate divisions, and to simply have the teams with the five best records make the playoffs. I for one think this would be a huge mistake.
First, it is important to note that aside from Buster Olney, several very well-respected baseball writers have come out in favor of the realignmnent plan. Dave Cameron and Jeff Passan, in particular, do excellent and thoughtful work, and are both strongly in favor of the plan. This means that, despite being originally brought to light by Olney, that this idea must have some credence.
Cameron, in particular, feels that the proposed plan makes for a fairer sport. He points out the disparity between the four-team AL West and the six-team NL Central, and also the fundamental disadvantage that the rest of the AL East has when faced with the Yankee and Red Sox behemoths. Essentially, Cameron concludes that "While I’ve been trained to believe that nearly every “improvement” MLB suggests is probably a bad idea, this actually seems like a pretty fantastic idea to me, in large part due to my desire to see increased fairness in the sport."
Fairness. Fairness? For those in favor of realignment, fairness really does seem to be the main sticking point. And who could disagree? I think we all should hope for a system where the best teams make the playoffs, where all fan bases can have the opportunity to root for a winner, and no team need be structurally disadvantaged. However, I don't think that this drastic realignment plan truly addresses these issues -- and if it did, the downsides far outweigh the advantages.
For the sake of brevity, I'll present the following reasons in list format:
1. If you're concerned about the AL West and NL Central being imbalanced -- which I have been for a decade -- why not just move a team?
Let the Astros, or whomever, go to the AL West. Then, you've got equal divisions everywhere. Will there be the "constant interleague" problem? Sure. But it's no more or less than with the other plan.
2. Getting rid of division races would be terrible for the regular season, and for the sport in general.
Watching division races down the stretch is the best thing about baseball. Would you rather watch the Mets and Phillies battle head to head down the stretch, or watch the Marlins and Padres jockey for the fifth and final playoff spot?
I think we've all seen what it's like when a sport has most of its field battling it out in a vague homogeneous mix. In hockey, the regular season is practically irrelevant. It's the same in basketball. In those sports, all the top teams get to coast to the finish while a few battle it out for the last few playoff spots.
Take, for instance, the National League in 2007. Down the stretch, we were treated to an incredible division race in the NL East ... I need not remind any of you what happened, but it was incredibly exciting and memorable for all of baseball. In the proposed realignment plan, that never happens. The Mets make the playoffs without any dramatics at all.
3. This doesn't solve the problem of competitive imbalance.
What baseball should be striving for is a good competitive balance, and an environment where every team can truly compete. They shouldn't be realigning the sport in order to provide a wimpy excuse where they can say "Hey, there were five playoff spots and you didn't make it! You have nobody to blame but yourself."
Would realignment in any season have helped the Pirates or Royals make the playoffs? Are we really so hung up on the Rays and Red Sox that the entire sport has to have a detrimental make-over? We've already got a wild card -- if the advantage that the Yankees and Red Sox have is, in fact, so steep to the point when it ruins the game, why not address it substantively rather than passive-aggressively?
This realignment plan sounds to me like MLB is conceding that the Yankees and Red Sox will make the playoffs every year, and they need to figure out a way to make it seem fair for the other teams to fight for the scraps. That, to me, is the real problem.
4. What is truly fair? And should the "best teams" making the playoffs even be a concern? And even if the teams with the five best balanced records made the playoffs, would that make them the best?
Ultimately, we all agree that there should be fairness in the sport. But I believe that should be as a result of policy and rule changes to the competition side, not the playoff method.
Was it fair for the Mets to miss the playoffs in 2007 while the Cubs made it with an inferior record? I think that it was. Chicago won it's division, and the Mets did not, even when they had the chance to. Was it fair for the Cardinals to make the playoffs in 2006 with 83 wins, while Philadelphia (85) and Los Angeles (88) went home? I submit to you that it was. We all know what the Cardinals went on to do that season in winning the World Series -- doesn't that make them the best?
Baseball is a game. It's not a scientific study to determine which team is "best" in a given year. I imagine that if there even were a way to determine the "best" team, that they probably don't win the World Series more than a third of the time.
I agree that there are issues in our sport that need addressing. However, radically reshaping the sport and creating a host of other issues (interleague, travel, DH, 15th place teams) is not the way I believe we should be addressing them.
Sunday, January 02, 2011
Being "For" or "Against" Sabermetrics
[This post was started a few weeks ago when the Hall of Fame debates were raging. I never got a chance to finish the post to my satisfaction, but since I already put a lot of time into it, I figure that I'll publish what I have anyway. Hope you all enjoy.]
Over the last few years, the term "sabermetrics" and the concepts related to it have started to seep into the mainstream baseball consciousness. The now-famous book, Moneyball, is what truly ignited interest in the media and among the common fan, and now, years later there are varying degrees of awareness, comprehension, and acceptance of these ideas.
On the one side are the sabermetric experts, the men and women who pioneered the research providing the foundation of sabermetrics, as well as forward-thinking blogs and those who now might be employed in baseball to do this kind of statistical analysis. On the complete opposite end of the spectrum are "average joe" types of fans who have never heard of "sabermetrics" as well as those who have and have decided that they don't provide any positive value to the game. At this point, most writers, even mainstream writers, have at this point at the very least acknowledged the existence of sabermetrics, and many have written primers on the topic or go so far as to use them themselves.
The group that you seem to hear from the least, ironically, are those in the middle - people who would take sabermetrics and use them as a rational compliment to everything they already know about baseball. Most discussion of sabermetrics, as a field in general, has been very dogmatic. Much like politics here in America, most of the discussion is dominated by extremes. So, why all this by way of introduction?
Last week, I posted a lengthy (probably too lengthy) write-up of Dillon Gee and explained why I think the mainstream expectations of Gee resulting from his successful major league cameo were too high. I looked at some minor league numbers, his pitches and velocity, and some comparable players, and tried to temper everyone's expectations a little bit. As I am lucky enough to have traffic to this blog, and a lot of interesting, critical, insightful readers, I got some feedback on the article which disagreed with me. That's great -- in fact, the rapid exchange of ideas and viewpoints is exactly what makes blogs the incredible medium that they are.
In this case, however, the person who responded went by the handle "AgainstSabermetrics" said something which I felt compelled to address:
There's no reason to be "against" advanced statistics, sabermetrics, or its derivatives, for exactly the same reason why a person who is into advanced stats shouldn't be "against" batting average, or scouting, or RBIs. They exist - regardless of our personal opinions - and it is simply up to us to decide for ourselves how important we think they are.
It's unnecessary to make it a binary "for" or "against" sabermetrics argument. It is a false dichotomy. As a matter of fact, in this case, I didn't simply use sabermetric stats to make my decision. If you click through to the article, I look at ERA, strikeouts, reports of his pitches and their velocity, and comparisons to pitchers who I considered to be similar major leaguers. Here is my conclusion in a nutshell:
But back to the original point: the battle between scouts, and statistics, and advanced statistics is really a silly one. Each of those angles provide you with a different kind of insight, and they should all be considered. All of them reveal something, and all of them, I don't care which one you like, will sometimes mislead you. It is up to you - the reader, the writer, the fan - to try and give each its appropriate weight.
I've heard a lot of people - from big-time writers down to bloggers and commenters - say that they "reject" sabermetrics. One obvious example of a writer who has rejected the idea of advanced statistics is Murray Chass, who used to write for the New York Times. Murray went so far as to say silly things like this:
The point is, baseball is a beautiful game which can be summed up by statistics in a way that no other sport can. In football, every play is affected by dozens of people. In basketball, there are ten men on the court at any moment and the numbers you derive from that are affected by those around you, the offensive scheme you're running, etc. But in baseball, it's just you. The batter and pitcher face off in a miniature play we've seen a million times. So when you look at that Harry Wright player card, you're not just going to see hits. You're going to see walks. And strikeouts and stolen bases and grounded into double plays. By the time 1894 rolled around, they had started counting sacrifice hits. For pitchers, they were already keeping track of complete games, home runs allowed, wild pitches, and balks. None of those are essential to the enjoyment of the game - but all of them were tracked shortly after the American Civil War, and before the telephone, and before electricity, and before homes had running water.
Sabermetrics are an interesting tool. And for me, I like them because they allow me - if I am willing to do the work - to look at a player who I may not have had the opportunity to see play very much on television and help me develop an informed opinion of them. I don't consider them to be the be-all-end-all of player evaluation. I believe that most of the intelligent folk who follow advanced statistics feel the same way.
One of the major criticisms you hear from those who dislike sabermetrics is the idea that someone can look at WAR, or wOBA, or some other number and immediately decide that one player is better than another because of it. That's not what it's all about. It's simply a way that we can take the information that we have and put it into perspective - across leagues, across generations. When you think about it, even batting average is a derivative stat: H/AB = BA. Is that much more outlandish than OBP? Or SLG? Or OPS, which is simply OBP+SLG?
As for the reader who commented and disagreed - thank you for putting my idea on trial. In doing so, one would hope that we can come to better, more accurate, and more useful answers. For instance, if anyone clicks through to the article and reads the comment in its entirety they can see it themselves, the commenter mentioned that Gee could touch 95 with his fastball but was operating around 88 in an effort to work the corners of the plate. I thought that the excerpt from the behavioral doctor was interesting as well.
Being for or against sabermetrics is a silly concept. Mainstream writers who poke fun at saber-style writers and articles should be ashamed of themselves. Sabermetricians have done some truly incredible and interesting research over the years, and reading it has greatly expanded my appreciation of the game. The statistics available to me on Dillon Gee and of players who I thought were similar based on actually watching him, allowed me to form a more well-educated decision than if I had simply watched him pitch four games in September.
If you're trying to make an informed decision, you should take all the information available to you and decide yourself what you think is the most important.
Over the last few years, the term "sabermetrics" and the concepts related to it have started to seep into the mainstream baseball consciousness. The now-famous book, Moneyball, is what truly ignited interest in the media and among the common fan, and now, years later there are varying degrees of awareness, comprehension, and acceptance of these ideas.
On the one side are the sabermetric experts, the men and women who pioneered the research providing the foundation of sabermetrics, as well as forward-thinking blogs and those who now might be employed in baseball to do this kind of statistical analysis. On the complete opposite end of the spectrum are "average joe" types of fans who have never heard of "sabermetrics" as well as those who have and have decided that they don't provide any positive value to the game. At this point, most writers, even mainstream writers, have at this point at the very least acknowledged the existence of sabermetrics, and many have written primers on the topic or go so far as to use them themselves.
The group that you seem to hear from the least, ironically, are those in the middle - people who would take sabermetrics and use them as a rational compliment to everything they already know about baseball. Most discussion of sabermetrics, as a field in general, has been very dogmatic. Much like politics here in America, most of the discussion is dominated by extremes. So, why all this by way of introduction?
Last week, I posted a lengthy (probably too lengthy) write-up of Dillon Gee and explained why I think the mainstream expectations of Gee resulting from his successful major league cameo were too high. I looked at some minor league numbers, his pitches and velocity, and some comparable players, and tried to temper everyone's expectations a little bit. As I am lucky enough to have traffic to this blog, and a lot of interesting, critical, insightful readers, I got some feedback on the article which disagreed with me. That's great -- in fact, the rapid exchange of ideas and viewpoints is exactly what makes blogs the incredible medium that they are.
In this case, however, the person who responded went by the handle "AgainstSabermetrics" said something which I felt compelled to address:
How many would love to be good enough to beat the Phillies starting on the bump? Why do you sabermetric guys all cover each other's backs? The results will come. The Mets minor league blog said that if Gee got to start in the Show, it probably would not go well. That statement was all based on sabermetrics. As the previous responder showed very well, the percentages(numbers) don't always add up. The results are real. It will be interesting to see how scientifically viable the sabermetrics are with this player. Even more interesting, how will the sabermetric scouts respond to the results that defy their science?Like I said, it's cool if you want to disagree with the conclusions I've drawn. However, I see a few things in Dillon Gee that make me think he'll have a harder time than most in transitioning to the major leagues -- maybe you don't. The part of the response that I excerpted above, however, is a common attitude and one which I think is silly.
There's no reason to be "against" advanced statistics, sabermetrics, or its derivatives, for exactly the same reason why a person who is into advanced stats shouldn't be "against" batting average, or scouting, or RBIs. They exist - regardless of our personal opinions - and it is simply up to us to decide for ourselves how important we think they are.
It's unnecessary to make it a binary "for" or "against" sabermetrics argument. It is a false dichotomy. As a matter of fact, in this case, I didn't simply use sabermetric stats to make my decision. If you click through to the article, I look at ERA, strikeouts, reports of his pitches and their velocity, and comparisons to pitchers who I considered to be similar major leaguers. Here is my conclusion in a nutshell:
In summary, there are three things that Petit, Bannister, and Gee have in common that make me wary about Gee's ability to strive in the majors.These are not advanced sabermetric concepts -- and in fact, I try to keep away from FIP, WAR and similarly advanced statistics in my writing to keep it accessible. I'd like for my Dad to be only somewhat confused at what I'm talking about as opposed to completely lost.
1. Low-minors success based on excellent K/BB ratios
2. Right-handers with low-velocity fastballs (topping out around 89)
3. Escalating HR/9 ratios, particularly in Triple-A
When you throw soft, and depend on location, it is a very bad if not fatal sign when more advanced hitters can start taking you yard with regularity.
But back to the original point: the battle between scouts, and statistics, and advanced statistics is really a silly one. Each of those angles provide you with a different kind of insight, and they should all be considered. All of them reveal something, and all of them, I don't care which one you like, will sometimes mislead you. It is up to you - the reader, the writer, the fan - to try and give each its appropriate weight.
I've heard a lot of people - from big-time writers down to bloggers and commenters - say that they "reject" sabermetrics. One obvious example of a writer who has rejected the idea of advanced statistics is Murray Chass, who used to write for the New York Times. Murray went so far as to say silly things like this:
I suppose that if stats mongers want to sit at their computers and play with these things all day long, that’s their prerogative. But their attempt to introduce these new-age statistics into the game threatens to undermine most fans’ enjoyment of baseball and the human factor therein.Ouch. He later on called those who enjoy sabermetrics "devotees" of the concept and "followers" of those who have studied it. Creepy, huh? If you're going to bash sabermetrics, you should eat least do it in a way that's funny, like Jon Heyman did when he called those who follow those numbers VORPies:
People play baseball. Numbers don’t.
Sorry VORPies, Rollins was the right choice... I wasn't shocked that stats people have taken issue with Rollins winning the MVP award. There are numbers crunchers out there [] who believe baseball writers rank somewhere between morons and idiots for voting Rollins as MVP over David Wright, who had a higher VORP. The stat people seem to believe VORP [] defines a player...It gets a little crazy down there in the trenches, I guess, and people always act scared when they are confronted with something that they don't understand. Even in a children's game like baseball. But there's no reason why a professional writer, broadcaster, or scout, can't make a slight effort to learn a thing of two about the advanced stats and what they have to say and enlighten their own point of view. A great, great example of this is what Bill Simmons did a few short months ago:
See, I stopped writing about baseball these past two years when the sabermetrics movement became too complicated for my liking... I just hated the finality of it, the concept that numbers could trump anything I was watching with my own two eyes. If numbers always prevailed, what was the point of watching baseball or having arguments about it?And they make them more fun for me as well. I love baseball, and one of the most interesting and unique things about it is that it is a sport in which everything can be measured. There are statistics for the National League on baseball-reference.com dating as far back as 1876! Yes, you read that right. There are statistics for the National Association which go back even further - there are stats and standings from 1871. Do you want to know how many hits Harry Wright had in 1871? Well, you can find out by clicking here. He was born in 1835.
Thirty-five years later, those numbers don't tell us nearly enough... Throw everything together (visual and sabermetric), and 1975 Freddie Lynn stands the test of time. But I had to do some work to prove it. And that's what this is all about: work. Not everyone wants to work to follow sports. This isn't school. We don't want to do homework. We don't want to study. We just want to watch games.
I spent March reading and surfing sabermetrics for mostly selfish reasons ("I want this column to be better," "I want an edge for fantasy purposes," "I'm bored"), but also because the advanced formulas weren't nearly as intimidating as I had expected. Full disclosure: I, um ... I-I kinda like them. I even understand why stat junkies take it so personally whenever a mainstream guy spouts out an uninformed baseball opinion. It's too easy to be informed these days. Takes a lot less time than you might think....These stats make understanding baseball more fun. At least for me.
The point is, baseball is a beautiful game which can be summed up by statistics in a way that no other sport can. In football, every play is affected by dozens of people. In basketball, there are ten men on the court at any moment and the numbers you derive from that are affected by those around you, the offensive scheme you're running, etc. But in baseball, it's just you. The batter and pitcher face off in a miniature play we've seen a million times. So when you look at that Harry Wright player card, you're not just going to see hits. You're going to see walks. And strikeouts and stolen bases and grounded into double plays. By the time 1894 rolled around, they had started counting sacrifice hits. For pitchers, they were already keeping track of complete games, home runs allowed, wild pitches, and balks. None of those are essential to the enjoyment of the game - but all of them were tracked shortly after the American Civil War, and before the telephone, and before electricity, and before homes had running water.
Sabermetrics are an interesting tool. And for me, I like them because they allow me - if I am willing to do the work - to look at a player who I may not have had the opportunity to see play very much on television and help me develop an informed opinion of them. I don't consider them to be the be-all-end-all of player evaluation. I believe that most of the intelligent folk who follow advanced statistics feel the same way.
One of the major criticisms you hear from those who dislike sabermetrics is the idea that someone can look at WAR, or wOBA, or some other number and immediately decide that one player is better than another because of it. That's not what it's all about. It's simply a way that we can take the information that we have and put it into perspective - across leagues, across generations. When you think about it, even batting average is a derivative stat: H/AB = BA. Is that much more outlandish than OBP? Or SLG? Or OPS, which is simply OBP+SLG?
As for the reader who commented and disagreed - thank you for putting my idea on trial. In doing so, one would hope that we can come to better, more accurate, and more useful answers. For instance, if anyone clicks through to the article and reads the comment in its entirety they can see it themselves, the commenter mentioned that Gee could touch 95 with his fastball but was operating around 88 in an effort to work the corners of the plate. I thought that the excerpt from the behavioral doctor was interesting as well.
Being for or against sabermetrics is a silly concept. Mainstream writers who poke fun at saber-style writers and articles should be ashamed of themselves. Sabermetricians have done some truly incredible and interesting research over the years, and reading it has greatly expanded my appreciation of the game. The statistics available to me on Dillon Gee and of players who I thought were similar based on actually watching him, allowed me to form a more well-educated decision than if I had simply watched him pitch four games in September.
If you're trying to make an informed decision, you should take all the information available to you and decide yourself what you think is the most important.
Thursday, December 23, 2010
Debunking Dillon
Today, a quick look at Dillon Gee and the expectations being heaped upon him for the upcoming season. First, a look at the expectations:
We at Fonzie Forever like to pride ourselves on staying a step ahead of the curve. We were really excited about Jon Niese before his sterling 2010 debut. On the eve of his first start, we pointed out how quietly successful he had been through the minors. We later followed up by comparing him favorably with Wade Davis, a highly touted prospect on the Rays. Another outside the box profile was Jordany Valdespin before he became a household name among Mets prospect mavens.
The big one, and the subject of this article, is Dillon Gee. We profiled Gee in April of last season and pointed out that he had quietly been performing well at each level of the minors:
Minors Career - A/AA/AAA - 3.76 ERA, 7.96 K/9, 1.90 BB/9, 1.18 WHIP
2009 - Buffalo - AAA - 48 innings, 4.10 ERA, 2.63 K/BB, 1.30 WHIP
2010 - Buffalo - AAA - 161 innings, 4.96 ERA, 4.02 K/BB, 1.33 WHIP
2010 - Mets - MLB/AAA - 33 innings, 2.18 ERA, 1.13 K/BB, 1.21 WHIP
Pretty good performances in Triple-A, and then a spectacularly successful 33 inning cameo in the major leagues. It is those last 33 innings that are the driving force behind those who think that Gee is already prepared to be an adequate major league pitcher. But is Gee the pitcher that fans of the major league squad saw in September? Is he as good as his career minor league stats might indicate? Or is an ERA approaching 5.00 as he showed last season in Buffalo more accurate?
Unfortunately for the Mets, I think Gee's late success last year took his stock from grossly underrated to somewhat overrated. New York is a funny place (Rex Ryan foot video, anyone?). In my opinion, Gee is probably much closer to a 4.96 ERA in Triple-A kind of pitcher than anything else, and here's why:
1. His major league stats last year appeared to be the result of some *fantastic* luck. Gee's peripherals in his short New York cameo were not good - for instance, his strikeout to walk ratio of 17-15, and he struck out less than 5 batters per nine innings. According to Fangraphs, his batting average on balls in play was an extremely fortunate .232, when in the long run it should end up somewhere in the neighborhood of .300 or a little higher. He managed to strand on base over 80% of the runners he allowed, which is a high number. And he allowed home runs on less than 5% of his fly balls.
For those in the sabermetric crowd, that's almost a "perfect game" of luck - everything broke his way. Granted, it was only 33 innings, and you can't put too much stock into such a small sample size - but that is exactly my point as well. Those 33 innings tell you almost nothing, and since Gee appears to be the beneficiary of some great luck, he is unlikely to be nearly as good in the future.
2. His stuff doesn't dominate you. Gee gets by with a fastball that averaged 89.1 MPH last season, along with a change and slider. He managed to get a very good amount of ground balls (47%), and I don't have access to minorleaguesplits.com right now (site broken) but I imagine that ground balls are an important part of his game. Even assuming that he can continue to get batters to pound the ball into the ground, not having good 'stuff' will catch up with you in the upper minors and the Show. Yes, a lot of pitchers get by with 89 mile per hour fastballs -- but a lot of those guys are lefthanded, or struggled for years, or have great secondary offerings. Gee can succeed as a righthander with that kind of repertoire (Greg Maddux was throwing 85 at the end of his Braves tenure) but these guys tend to be the exceptions, not the rule.
3. His career minor league stats are aided by the 127 innings he spent in Single-A as a 22-year-old beating up on inferior competition. We won't even mention the 62 innings he dominated at short season Brooklyn after he graduated college. The only work of Gee's that should have much probative weight in guessing how he'll be in the major leagues is his work in Double and Triple-A, where his results were mixed.
None of this is to say that I don't think Dillon Gee won't be a useful major league player, or that I doubt he could even someday develop into a good pitcher in the #3 or #4 type mold. But I've seen this all before: crafty right-hander climbs up through the Mets minors, not overpowering stuff, but excellent strikeout-to-walk ratios. Except this player? He was even better, and even younger, than Gee. His name?
Yusmeiro Petit. I used to think that Petit was one of the best pitching prospects on the planet. He posted K/9 figures of 12 or better at FOUR consecutive minor league stops. He pitched in Double-A Binghamton as a 20 year old and posted a WHIP of 0.92(!) with a 2.91 ERA. But he didn't pass the eye test for some, and scouts didn't like him at the higher levels. I didn't care though - and in retrospect lost many an argument about it. I thought, "So what if his stuff is no good? If anything, he can make up for it with control and with his great instinct for pitching."
Lo and behold, Petit got crushed by better competition - unlike lower minors batters who he could strike out at ease, the more talented competition could take him yard seemingly at will. He possesses a career major league ERA of 5.58 and I think is seeking work. Incidentally, Petit's fastball was clocked at 88.7 when he broke into the major leagues.
For this reason, I think Gee has become overrated. I liked him last year as a future potential contributor, but in the last season, his stock has actually dropped in my mind. He went from a guy posting a 3.00 ERA and a 5-to-1 strikeout-to-walk in the low minors to a guy with an ERA between 4 and 5 in the high minors, and I consider that a warning sign.
As I said, there is no reason to believe that Gee CAN'T improve and take his game up to the level that the general population seems to think it should be -- I just doubt it. Even guys who you might consider to be soft-tossing righties can usually crack 90 miles per hour.
That's why I'd like to see Pat Misch be given the first crack at the #5 starter spot this spring. But if Gee can become another Scott Baker, or Jeff Suppan, or John Garland, then great.
NY Daily News: After Mike Pelfrey, Jon Niese and R.A. Dickey, Dillon Gee is the best internal option. The righthander impressed in a September callup, and the Mets hope he can secure a rotation spot
Bleacher Report: He could be the potential workhorse and innings-eater the Mets need...
Metsblog: So, if it comes down to Misch or Dillon Gee, I prefer Gee... Gee had more balanced results than Misch last year, he’s younger, and I think he has a slightly higher ceiling that Misch
NY Baseball Digest: Gee is certainly not a top of the rotation ace like Santana, nor does he have the potential of Mike Pelfrey, but Gee showed some moxie during his brief call up ... I can see Gee throwing 175 innings next year, winning 10 games, and pitching to a 4.50 ERA.
We at Fonzie Forever like to pride ourselves on staying a step ahead of the curve. We were really excited about Jon Niese before his sterling 2010 debut. On the eve of his first start, we pointed out how quietly successful he had been through the minors. We later followed up by comparing him favorably with Wade Davis, a highly touted prospect on the Rays. Another outside the box profile was Jordany Valdespin before he became a household name among Mets prospect mavens.
The big one, and the subject of this article, is Dillon Gee. We profiled Gee in April of last season and pointed out that he had quietly been performing well at each level of the minors:
Gee was drafted out of the 22nd round (unspectacular) and was assigned to short-season Class-A Brooklyn for his minor league debut (unspectacular). He pitched well there, but by the start of the 2008 season, he was a 22-year-old in Port St. Lucie -- nothing to get too excited about. [But] at what point do we have to look at Gee's performances and say to ourselves that he deserves a second look? From the start of the 2008 season and onward, he has been great - doing nothing to dispel the notion that he could someday prove to be a very good major league pitcher.Gee, as we all know, earned a call up from Triple-A Buffalo late last year and shone in his major league debut. Here's how his last two seasons have looked:
Minors Career - A/AA/AAA - 3.76 ERA, 7.96 K/9, 1.90 BB/9, 1.18 WHIP
2009 - Buffalo - AAA - 48 innings, 4.10 ERA, 2.63 K/BB, 1.30 WHIP
2010 - Buffalo - AAA - 161 innings, 4.96 ERA, 4.02 K/BB, 1.33 WHIP
2010 - Mets - MLB/AAA - 33 innings, 2.18 ERA, 1.13 K/BB, 1.21 WHIP
Pretty good performances in Triple-A, and then a spectacularly successful 33 inning cameo in the major leagues. It is those last 33 innings that are the driving force behind those who think that Gee is already prepared to be an adequate major league pitcher. But is Gee the pitcher that fans of the major league squad saw in September? Is he as good as his career minor league stats might indicate? Or is an ERA approaching 5.00 as he showed last season in Buffalo more accurate?
Unfortunately for the Mets, I think Gee's late success last year took his stock from grossly underrated to somewhat overrated. New York is a funny place (Rex Ryan foot video, anyone?). In my opinion, Gee is probably much closer to a 4.96 ERA in Triple-A kind of pitcher than anything else, and here's why:
1. His major league stats last year appeared to be the result of some *fantastic* luck. Gee's peripherals in his short New York cameo were not good - for instance, his strikeout to walk ratio of 17-15, and he struck out less than 5 batters per nine innings. According to Fangraphs, his batting average on balls in play was an extremely fortunate .232, when in the long run it should end up somewhere in the neighborhood of .300 or a little higher. He managed to strand on base over 80% of the runners he allowed, which is a high number. And he allowed home runs on less than 5% of his fly balls.
For those in the sabermetric crowd, that's almost a "perfect game" of luck - everything broke his way. Granted, it was only 33 innings, and you can't put too much stock into such a small sample size - but that is exactly my point as well. Those 33 innings tell you almost nothing, and since Gee appears to be the beneficiary of some great luck, he is unlikely to be nearly as good in the future.
2. His stuff doesn't dominate you. Gee gets by with a fastball that averaged 89.1 MPH last season, along with a change and slider. He managed to get a very good amount of ground balls (47%), and I don't have access to minorleaguesplits.com right now (site broken) but I imagine that ground balls are an important part of his game. Even assuming that he can continue to get batters to pound the ball into the ground, not having good 'stuff' will catch up with you in the upper minors and the Show. Yes, a lot of pitchers get by with 89 mile per hour fastballs -- but a lot of those guys are lefthanded, or struggled for years, or have great secondary offerings. Gee can succeed as a righthander with that kind of repertoire (Greg Maddux was throwing 85 at the end of his Braves tenure) but these guys tend to be the exceptions, not the rule.
3. His career minor league stats are aided by the 127 innings he spent in Single-A as a 22-year-old beating up on inferior competition. We won't even mention the 62 innings he dominated at short season Brooklyn after he graduated college. The only work of Gee's that should have much probative weight in guessing how he'll be in the major leagues is his work in Double and Triple-A, where his results were mixed.
None of this is to say that I don't think Dillon Gee won't be a useful major league player, or that I doubt he could even someday develop into a good pitcher in the #3 or #4 type mold. But I've seen this all before: crafty right-hander climbs up through the Mets minors, not overpowering stuff, but excellent strikeout-to-walk ratios. Except this player? He was even better, and even younger, than Gee. His name?
Yusmeiro Petit. I used to think that Petit was one of the best pitching prospects on the planet. He posted K/9 figures of 12 or better at FOUR consecutive minor league stops. He pitched in Double-A Binghamton as a 20 year old and posted a WHIP of 0.92(!) with a 2.91 ERA. But he didn't pass the eye test for some, and scouts didn't like him at the higher levels. I didn't care though - and in retrospect lost many an argument about it. I thought, "So what if his stuff is no good? If anything, he can make up for it with control and with his great instinct for pitching."
Lo and behold, Petit got crushed by better competition - unlike lower minors batters who he could strike out at ease, the more talented competition could take him yard seemingly at will. He possesses a career major league ERA of 5.58 and I think is seeking work. Incidentally, Petit's fastball was clocked at 88.7 when he broke into the major leagues.
For this reason, I think Gee has become overrated. I liked him last year as a future potential contributor, but in the last season, his stock has actually dropped in my mind. He went from a guy posting a 3.00 ERA and a 5-to-1 strikeout-to-walk in the low minors to a guy with an ERA between 4 and 5 in the high minors, and I consider that a warning sign.
As I said, there is no reason to believe that Gee CAN'T improve and take his game up to the level that the general population seems to think it should be -- I just doubt it. Even guys who you might consider to be soft-tossing righties can usually crack 90 miles per hour.
That's why I'd like to see Pat Misch be given the first crack at the #5 starter spot this spring. But if Gee can become another Scott Baker, or Jeff Suppan, or John Garland, then great.
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Not Baseball: Challenges in the NFL
Sorry for the off-topic, but I figure there are a lot of NFL fans in the crowd here and Giants fans in particular. Anyone who watched the game on Sunday (and who is not subsequently blocking out the pain) saw the play toward the end of the game where Vick dove forward instead of sliding, and the ball appeared to pop out of his hands. Why was there no challenge? That was the question on my mind, and on the mind of many of the callers today on WFAN.
You'll see the highlight of the play in question at 3:39 on the video:
The common wisdom among the callers and the hosts - some of whom stated this as gospel - said that the challenge HAD to come from the booth because it was within two minutes. Because of this, Coughlin couldn't challenge, and if it wasn't reviewed, it was because the booth decided it wasn't close enough to review. End of story.
As a lawyer, this didn't really satisfy me. Is the rule that the coach can't challenge within two minutes of the end of a half? Or can he not challenge plays that BEGIN after the two minute warning? What about a play - like in this case - that begins before the two minute warning, but where the part of the play you want to challenge is AFTER 2:00 has passed? My understanding was always that if the play began before the two minute warning, it was on the coach to challenge the play. That's a nice, bright-line rule.
So I tried to look up the actual rule. A quick glance at the NFL Digest of Rules didn't shed any light on the topic for me. I'm sure there is a copy of the NFL Rules out there somewhere on the internet, I just don't know where it is. Secondary sources had the issue equally confused.
Baseball is my sport, not football -- can anyone help me out? What is the exact rule on challenges? Did Coughlin screw up?
You'll see the highlight of the play in question at 3:39 on the video:
The common wisdom among the callers and the hosts - some of whom stated this as gospel - said that the challenge HAD to come from the booth because it was within two minutes. Because of this, Coughlin couldn't challenge, and if it wasn't reviewed, it was because the booth decided it wasn't close enough to review. End of story.
As a lawyer, this didn't really satisfy me. Is the rule that the coach can't challenge within two minutes of the end of a half? Or can he not challenge plays that BEGIN after the two minute warning? What about a play - like in this case - that begins before the two minute warning, but where the part of the play you want to challenge is AFTER 2:00 has passed? My understanding was always that if the play began before the two minute warning, it was on the coach to challenge the play. That's a nice, bright-line rule.
So I tried to look up the actual rule. A quick glance at the NFL Digest of Rules didn't shed any light on the topic for me. I'm sure there is a copy of the NFL Rules out there somewhere on the internet, I just don't know where it is. Secondary sources had the issue equally confused.
Wikipedia: Plays inside the two-minute-warning, and all plays in overtime, cannot be challenged; any review of that play must be initiated by a replay official off-fieldI think Wikipedia's definition is more accurate. But what do you guys think? The closest I could find for an answer was in a footnote near the bottom of this NJ.com article by Mike Garafalo (who seems to be doing a pretty good job):
eHow: The current system allows coaches to challenge on-field calls in certain areas of play before a new play begins by throwing a red flag, as long as the game is not within the last two minutes of either half.
I had one e-mailer ask if Vick fumbled at the end of his 22-yard run. No, I don’t believe he did. He was down with the ball in his possession and it only popped loose when LB Michael Boley fell on him. That’s down by contact right there. The e-mailer also asked me if it’s up to the booth to review the play because it ended at the two-minute warning. No, the Giants would have had to challenge that play because it began outside of the final two minutes.It may be, of course, that Vick was down by contact, making the whole issue moot. I can't find much aside from the above quote discussing the issue, despite the fact that it was on talk radio all day. Is that because nobody actually knows the rule? If that was a challenge which was incumbent upon Coughlin to make, and he didn't, I'd imagine there would be a ton of outrage, even if it was an unlikely challenge to win.
Baseball is my sport, not football -- can anyone help me out? What is the exact rule on challenges? Did Coughlin screw up?
Friday, December 17, 2010
Lastings Milledge, Mike Silva, and Lessons in Hearsay and Conjecture
I'm not a psychologist (or psychiatrist, or psychometrician, or anything of that nature) but we're written here before about something called "confirmation bias." I'll try and keep this as brief as possible:
A few days ago, Aaron Gleeman over at Hardball Talk picked up a story about my boy, Lastings Milledge, and a fight he got into in a Venezuelan winter league game. Here is the description of the event from an Adam Rubin tweet:
First, he misreported the story:
Then he was just generally snide about Milledge in general:
Then, to make matters worse, he took a hit by pitch in his next at bat, and then stole second? Isn't stealing second after a HBP what every fast little league or high school player is taught to do?
I can't embed the video, so you're going to have to watch it by clicking the link here. The clip begins with the fight. At around 2:39, you get a replay of the at-bat where Milledge steals second. It looks to me like he's just standing there minding his own business while the shortstop and second baseman are jawing at him.
Then at 2:53, who is THAT guy? Was that the first baseman, walking all the way across the field just to get in his face? And then, wasn't it that SAME player who shouldn't have been there in the first place who took the cheap shot and hit Lastings first? Couldn't it be argued that Milledge - who had just been hit by pitch, mind you - showed incredible restraint in this situation? And what exactly was being said between the parties? And where can I download that catchy song in the video?
The point is, we don't really know. We weren't there. It looks to me like Lastings was playing well in a "heated" game and did the right thing by getting on base and taking the extra base. Maybe the other team took exception because of the score. I don't know. Nobody knows. You don't know unless you were in the play, or watching the broadcast.
But you might think that you do know what happened, or close enough, if you already had a very strong preconceived notion of Lastings and who he is. Mike Silva apparently does. This may be an example of confirmation bias at work. "Hey, Lastings was in a fight! It must have been his fault."
Is this newsworthy? Sure, maybe. It is interesting as reported by Aaron Gleeman of the Hardball Talk. It's relevant, and it might not be a coincidence since it involves a player with a bad reputation. But to report it like Mike Silva did is bush league. Aside from the little we have on the video and the Adam Rubin tweet, which is hearsay, the rest is just conjecture.
Confirmation bias is a tendency for people to favor information that confirms their preconceptions or hypotheses regardless of whether the information is true. As a result, people gather evidence and recall information from memory selectively, and interpret it in a biased way. (source: wikipedia)
A few days ago, Aaron Gleeman over at Hardball Talk picked up a story about my boy, Lastings Milledge, and a fight he got into in a Venezuelan winter league game. Here is the description of the event from an Adam Rubin tweet:
Lastings Milledge involved in big team fight in winter ball. Venezuelan friend says: Heated game. After he doubled in 4th, he made like he was throwing grenade to his dugout. Other team didn’t like. Hit him in 7th. Then he took 2B. Other team went after him. BOOM-Big Fight.Wow, interesting story right? You think it'd be enough to report this story without reporting it inaccurately and generally impugning the character of someone who you know nothing about. Well - apparently not everyone felt that way. Mike Silva of New York Baseball Digest picked up the story and did ALL of that.
First, he misreported the story:
Earlier this week in Winter Ball, Milledge was up to his old tricks again when he threw a pretend grenade in the opposing dugout after a double.Incorrect. He threw the pretend grenade into his own dugout. Is this any different than the "claw" the Rangers did during their entire playoff run and that people loved so much?
Then he was just generally snide about Milledge in general:
Not the best way to let 30 general managers know that you have matured and are serious about playing baseball... Milledge has talked about growing up in the past, but apparently that is still a work in progress.I'm sorry -- am I missing something here? You mean to tell me that Lastings Milledge stroked a double in what was a "heated" game then made a gesture toward his own dugout. That's crazy!
Then, to make matters worse, he took a hit by pitch in his next at bat, and then stole second? Isn't stealing second after a HBP what every fast little league or high school player is taught to do?
I can't embed the video, so you're going to have to watch it by clicking the link here. The clip begins with the fight. At around 2:39, you get a replay of the at-bat where Milledge steals second. It looks to me like he's just standing there minding his own business while the shortstop and second baseman are jawing at him.
Then at 2:53, who is THAT guy? Was that the first baseman, walking all the way across the field just to get in his face? And then, wasn't it that SAME player who shouldn't have been there in the first place who took the cheap shot and hit Lastings first? Couldn't it be argued that Milledge - who had just been hit by pitch, mind you - showed incredible restraint in this situation? And what exactly was being said between the parties? And where can I download that catchy song in the video?
The point is, we don't really know. We weren't there. It looks to me like Lastings was playing well in a "heated" game and did the right thing by getting on base and taking the extra base. Maybe the other team took exception because of the score. I don't know. Nobody knows. You don't know unless you were in the play, or watching the broadcast.
But you might think that you do know what happened, or close enough, if you already had a very strong preconceived notion of Lastings and who he is. Mike Silva apparently does. This may be an example of confirmation bias at work. "Hey, Lastings was in a fight! It must have been his fault."
Is this newsworthy? Sure, maybe. It is interesting as reported by Aaron Gleeman of the Hardball Talk. It's relevant, and it might not be a coincidence since it involves a player with a bad reputation. But to report it like Mike Silva did is bush league. Aside from the little we have on the video and the Adam Rubin tweet, which is hearsay, the rest is just conjecture.
Sunday, November 28, 2010
The Mets and the Success Cycle
When you run a baseball team, the first thing that you should do (and I doubt the Mets have done this in a while) is to take a look at where you are on the success cycle. I haven't been able to find much reference online to this concept as it relates to baseball, but it's an enormously important concept in business. In business, however, it is referred to as the life cycle.
In business, products and even companies as a whole participate in some general permutation of this cycle. A business or product will debut, will grow, and will hit their initial peak. From that point, they can adapt and make changes which will bring them to a new, higher plateau, or they can be allowed to decline until they no longer exist. Where you are on that cycle determines what kinds of decisions you will make - whether to invest in R&D, whether to make capital improvements, etc.
In baseball, however, all 30 teams exist and will continue to exist regardless of their success or failure. One look at the Pirates or Royals will assure you that no matter how bad you are and for how long, you won't go out of business (contraction talk aside). What does remain true, however, is the fact that teams are better or worse equipped to "make a run" at the playoffs or to "rebuild" depending on factors as plentiful as the ages of their star players, the condition of their facilities, changes in ownership, changes in the economy of their surrounding area, and the relative strength or weakness of their farm system.
As far as the success cycle and baseball goes, it appears the most prominent article on it was written years ago by Jonah Keri over at Baseball Prospectus. Although he never explicitly defines the success cycle, he takes an in-depth look at the 2002 Pittsburgh Pirates and discusses the importance of determining your place on it:
In business, products and even companies as a whole participate in some general permutation of this cycle. A business or product will debut, will grow, and will hit their initial peak. From that point, they can adapt and make changes which will bring them to a new, higher plateau, or they can be allowed to decline until they no longer exist. Where you are on that cycle determines what kinds of decisions you will make - whether to invest in R&D, whether to make capital improvements, etc.
In baseball, however, all 30 teams exist and will continue to exist regardless of their success or failure. One look at the Pirates or Royals will assure you that no matter how bad you are and for how long, you won't go out of business (contraction talk aside). What does remain true, however, is the fact that teams are better or worse equipped to "make a run" at the playoffs or to "rebuild" depending on factors as plentiful as the ages of their star players, the condition of their facilities, changes in ownership, changes in the economy of their surrounding area, and the relative strength or weakness of their farm system.
As far as the success cycle and baseball goes, it appears the most prominent article on it was written years ago by Jonah Keri over at Baseball Prospectus. Although he never explicitly defines the success cycle, he takes an in-depth look at the 2002 Pittsburgh Pirates and discusses the importance of determining your place on it:
The cycle is a baseball continuum on which every team resides. To measure a team's place in the cycle, assess its talent in the majors and minors. Can the players in the organization, mixed with a few trade acquisitions and free agents the team could reasonably sign, yield a competitive team? More precisely, can the team expect to compete while its current core of major-league players remain productive and under contract?
Wally Backman Continues to Prove Mets Management Correct
Over the last thousand posts here at Fonzie, you could probably count on one hand the number of entries devoted to discussing managerial issues. Why? It's not that I don't think managers are important -- but rather, we as outsiders really have no way of knowing which human being will do the best job managing our baseball club. We can dislike moves in isolation, or we can have broader complaints (bullpen management is a good example) but in general, we just do not have much information on which to base our opinions.
With managerial *candidates*, we know even less. In most cases, we haven't actually seen them manage. Most of what we know will come from published media, a few games a couple of years ago when they were a generic opposing manager, and perhaps some quotes from former players. And for candidates like Wally Backman who have never managed in the major leagues? We - and when I say we, I mean fans - know basically nothing.
With managerial *candidates*, we know even less. In most cases, we haven't actually seen them manage. Most of what we know will come from published media, a few games a couple of years ago when they were a generic opposing manager, and perhaps some quotes from former players. And for candidates like Wally Backman who have never managed in the major leagues? We - and when I say we, I mean fans - know basically nothing.
Wednesday, November 24, 2010
What Would YOU Pay Jeter to Join the Mets?
Over on Amazin Avenue, the epicenter of rational thought in the Mets blogosphere, they had a poll this morning [1]asking readers the following:
Would you sign Derek Jeter to play for the Mets? To my surprise, the responses were overwhelmingly negative. By a margin of 76% to 23%, respondents voted no.[2]
I would most certainly sign Jeter if he was willing to play second base rather than shortstop. The real question, as far as I'm concerned, is "how much would you be willing to pay him?" I imagine that most of the people that voted "no" in the above poll did so because they took ancillary factors into account, such as price.
As far as I can tell, the question breaks down into two parts. One, what is Jeter's on-field value likely to be? And two, what is his off-the-field value to the Mets?
Would you sign Derek Jeter to play for the Mets? To my surprise, the responses were overwhelmingly negative. By a margin of 76% to 23%, respondents voted no.[2]
I would most certainly sign Jeter if he was willing to play second base rather than shortstop. The real question, as far as I'm concerned, is "how much would you be willing to pay him?" I imagine that most of the people that voted "no" in the above poll did so because they took ancillary factors into account, such as price.
As far as I can tell, the question breaks down into two parts. One, what is Jeter's on-field value likely to be? And two, what is his off-the-field value to the Mets?
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
Time to Shut Niese Down
A couple weeks ago, Jerry Manuel was asked how he felt about capping the workload this season for Jon Niese. His answer was thoughtful:
I happen to still like Manuel, and that was a reasonable argument made at a time when it made sense. A dialogue is good, and you might want to use your instinct and senses in addition to looking at a strict numerical pattern - especially considering Niese has hurled around 180 innings in a season before (in 2008).
“They kind of have to kind to convince me,” Manuel said. “Because I believe a guy should learn how to pitch. The more he gets out there, the better pitcher he’s going to become for you.”
“Because if you’ve got a guy pitching well, and you’re trying to win games, then that puts some shackles on you,” Manuel said. “That’s tough. What if a guy’s throwing a no-hitter?”
“I don’t have any problems with the dialogue or what have you,” he said. “If the majority feels that [he should be limited], and proves that this is going to make something better for whatever, I don’t see a problem with that.” Source: NJ.com
I happen to still like Manuel, and that was a reasonable argument made at a time when it made sense. A dialogue is good, and you might want to use your instinct and senses in addition to looking at a strict numerical pattern - especially considering Niese has hurled around 180 innings in a season before (in 2008).
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